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Abstract 
The author uses a quantitative network analysis approach to assess how participants in 
the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) respond to partial outages at other banks. 
Despite the limited number of operational events, benchmarks can be established. For 
example, the effect of a partial outage at a big six bank that has a net payment balance of 
$1 billion is estimated to correspond to a decline in connectivity of about 6 or 7 per cent, 
due to other participants not sending payments to the problem participant. This suggests 
that participants tend to perceive a partial outage at a counterparty as inconvenient 
enough to warrant a delaying of payments, at least to the problem participant. There is no 
strong evidence of systemic effects, whereby participants also delay payments to non-
problem counterparties, in an effort to maintain a reasonable liquidity position. Notable 
events mostly occurred in 2004 or 2005, and the incidence of operational events did not 
increase over the sample period. The improvement of contingency measures, such as the 
use of the LVTS Direct Network, possibly contributed in this regard. 
JEL classification: C49, G14, G21 
Bank classification: Payment, clearing, and settlement systems 
Résumé 
L’auteur utilise une approche quantitative d’analyse des réseaux afin d’évaluer comment 
les institutions qui font partie du Système de transfert de paiements de grande valeur 
(STPGV) réagissent en cas de panne partielle chez d’autres participants. Malgré le 
nombre limité d’incidents opérationnels à s’être produits, il est possible d’établir des 
balises. À titre d’exemple, on estime que l’effet d’une panne partielle dans une des six 
grandes banques canadiennes qui aurait un solde net de paiement de un milliard de 
dollars correspond à une perte de connectivité d’environ 6 ou 7  %, attribuable à 
l’interruption des paiements envoyés à cette institution par les autres. Un tel résultat 
indique que ce type d’incident est généralement assez préoccupant aux yeux des 
participants pour justifier un report des paiements, du moins à la contrepartie en cause. 
Rien ne laisse valablement supposer la présence d’effets systémiques, qui amèneraient les 
participants à différer leurs paiements même à ceux qui fonctionnent normalement, dans 
un effort pour maintenir l’équilibre de leur situation de trésorerie. Les incidents 
opérationnels d’importance sont survenus pour la plupart en 2004 ou en 2005, et leur 
incidence n’a pas augmenté au cours de la période étudiée. L’amélioration des mesures 
de contingence, comme le recours au réseau direct du STPGV, n’est peut-être pas 
étrangère à cette évolution. 
Classification JEL : C49, G14, G21 
Classification de la Banque : Systèmes de paiement, de compensation et de règlement 1 Introduction
The Bank of Canada has previously studied the systemic e®ects of a participant
outage within the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS), through simulation
exercises. The LVTS is of particular interest because it is part of the core of
Canada's ¯nancial infrastructure, and eases the implementation of monetary
policy.1 A limitation of simulation exercises, however, has been that they of-
ten do not account for adaptive participant behaviour, or instead make ad hoc
assumptions in this regard. This study uses a quantitative network analysis ap-
proach to assess how LVTS participant behaviour, as re°ected by LVTS network
structure, has changed when encountering a disruption in the system. Network
analysis has the advantage of giving a summarized, system-wide perspective,
rather than a disorganized view of a multitude of individual actions.
Operational events, and speci¯cally partial outages, could have the imme-
diate e®ect of compromising payment activity, especially with respect to the
problem participant.2 A partial outage denotes an event where the participant
can receive payments but is either unable to send payments or experiences a
slowdown in its ability to do so. This situation creates the risk of a liquidity
trap, and is the most common type of participant outage, since payments are
cleared and settled in the LVTS, but they are sent from a participant's facilities
¡ unless a participant is o²ine or suspended, the LVTS will continue to process
payments sent to the participant.3 There might also be a system-wide e®ect of
reduced payments activity, if participants become concerned about their overall
liquidity position.
This paper examines partial outage e®ects on payment activity, focusing on
a network perspective. It is a natural extension of Embree and Roberts (2009),
which described and analyzed the network structure of LVTS payment activity.
Network analysis is the study of how a set of agents link to one another, in terms
of connectivity, reciprocity, distance and centrality, described in section 3. In a
payment, clearing and settlement system, this can mean payment °ows among
participants, the approach this study uses (thus, the idea of connectivity in
network analysis is distinct from that of connectivity in terms of IT systems).4
Partial outages provide an opportunity to test how payment disruptions can
a®ect this structure, due to the unexpected and exogenous nature of an outage.
Initial Fisher sign tests on connectivity support the hypothesis that a pre-
cautionary reaction with respect to problem participants could be taking place.
1See Arjani and McVanel (2006) for an overview of the LVTS.
2An operational event can be de¯ned as an event where human error, fraud, management
failure, de¯ciencies in information systems or internal controls, or disruption from external
events such as natural disasters, terrorism or pandemics, results in unexpected losses. Busi-
ness reputation and the resource cost of resolving an event could be other concerns. The
LVTS operational events in this study, however, have mostly resulted in an interruption or
slowdown to operations.
3Conversely, an inability to \receive" payments, due to a connection problem between a
participant's systems and the LVTS, would mean that only the participant's systems would
not record the received payments.
4Please refer to Embree and Roberts (2009) for an introduction to the main measures.
1Precautionary behaviour means that participants stop payments to another par-
ticipant experiencing a partial outage, very soon after the Canadian Payments
Association (CPA) sends a noti¯cation. For connectivity, which is a network-
wide measure, the e®ect is noticeable only when the problem participant is a
big six bank. Directly counting the number of participants that continue to
send payments to a problem participant (the \in-degree") reveals, though, that
a decline occurs for both large and small problem participants. The number
of counterparties almost always falls below a problem participant's mean in-
degree. However, in absolute terms, the e®ect is the greatest with respect to
the big six banks.
The econometric models then take network connectivity and reciprocity as
the dependent variables and use calendar events, payment activity, lagged terms
and characteristics of the operational event as explanatory variables. Although
calendar and time-of-day e®ects are the most important, network connectivity
and reciprocity nevertheless decline, depending on the type of event (either a
payment slowdown or interruption) and the identity of the problem participant.
A positive net payment balance at the problem participant during the partial
outage, indicating the absorption of liquidity, also corresponds to reduced net-
work connectivity. The e®ect of a partial outage at a big six bank that has a
net balance of $1 billion is estimated to correspond to a decline in connectivity
of about 6 or 7 per cent. This estimate is above and beyond the reduction in
payment activity owing to the problem participant not sending payments.
Given that the problem participant is only 1 of 14 participants (not counting
the Bank of Canada), this can be seen as a moderate but meaningful tendency
for participants to exercise precaution toward a problem participant. The impli-
cation is that participants tend to perceive a partial outage at a counterparty as
inconvenient enough to warrant a delaying of payments, at least to the problem
counterparty. This could be interpreted as an indication of active management
by banks of their payment activity or intraday liquidity.
Further possibilities exist for behavioural reactions to an operational event.
Participants could take a precautionary stance toward the rest of the network,
as well, to avoid a disadvantageous liquidity position. This would lead to a
contraction in the subnetwork that excludes the problem participant. The
results show that this scenario might have occurred, to an extent, in a couple
of the small number of partial outages at major banks. But, more typically,
participants seem to continue to send payments as usual to other non-problem
participants. To cause systemic disruption, an operational event would likely
have to be considerably more serious than the type of simple outage experienced
in the LVTS so far.
Operational risk analysis in the past has helped the Bank of Canada and oth-
ers to develop contingency measures. These allow participants to work around
a failure in a system; an example is the LVTS Direct Network, which has been
available for use during outages since December 2005. Through the Direct
Network, for instance, the small number of payments that are of particularly
high value can be sent to alleviate liquidity pressure. A precautionary delay
of payments, however, depends on noti¯cation by the problem participant, and
2the CPA, of the disruption. Admittedly, a delay in noti¯cation can often occur,
but available contingency measures seem adequate, based on the events in this
data set.5
The reliability of the LVTS means there is a scarcity of serious events to
study. Lack of data is a common problem in operational risk research, and
does not make it easy to draw conclusions about high-impact events, which
are the most infrequent. Past events might also not provide good indicators of
how other participants will respond in the future, due to changes in technol-
ogy, sources of risk, risk management, contingency measures or simply because
a particular low-frequency, high-impact event might not have a precedent. A
quantitative approach to operational risk thus cannot provide a de¯nitive anal-
ysis, but can potentially contribute to discussions and the formulation of sce-
narios related to operational risk.
Section 2 summarizes the related literature, and section 3 brie°y describes
the LVTS network structure, and the measures used in this paper. Section 4
describes the data and section 5 the methodology. Section 6 reports the results
and section 7 o®ers some conclusions. The appendix provides a few network
measure formulas.
2 Related Literature
As one part of their study, SoramÄ aki et al. (2006) examine the impact on
the Fedwire network of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
States. They ¯nd that massive damage to property and communications sys-
tems made it more di±cult, or impossible, for some Fedwire participants to send
payments, and connectivity dropped by up to 13 per cent, about four times the
standard deviation. The initial payment disruption had a subsequent e®ect on
other participants that were then short on incoming payments. Cheung (2002)
describes the impact of 11 September on payment °ows in the LVTS, using
half-hourly multilateral balances for two weeks in January and February of
2002, contrasted with 11 September 2001. Payment volume dropped by more
than a standard deviation between 10 a.m. and noon on that day.
Theoretical models on coordination in payments systems search for expla-
nations for broad patterns in payment activity. Bech and Garratt (2006) have
an n-player game theory model where banks choose to send payments in the
morning or afternoon. They ¯nd that a disruption that forces some banks to
pay in the afternoon could lead to an afternoon equilibrium, where all banks
delay payments, because of reduced liquidity from fewer incoming payments
5If the network had otherwise seemed unable to handle the events a®ecting a key partici-
pant, for example, the Bank of Canada might have needed to be more proactive in coordinat-
ing contingency measures that reinforce the available system resources for that participant.
The economic rationale for further central bank support would be that private costs and ben-
e¯ts in preventing delays may not be aligned with social costs and bene¯ts for the network.
Operational risk creates costs for the participant itself, but also for counterparties, which will
not be fully accounted for in private decisions to mitigate operational risk.
3in the morning.6 From a social perspective, it is better to avoid delay and
gridlock.
Merrouche and Schanz (2009) use a related 2-player, 3-period (morning,
afternoon, evening) game-theory model, to predict that banks will delay a pay-
ment to a counterparty experiencing an outage only in the morning, because
they are still uncertain of any urgent payment instructions they might receive
in the afternoon. Based on their sample of eight 2007 outages in the Clear-
ing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS) at the ¯ve main banks, they
conclude that the reaction to outages is stronger in the morning than in the
afternoon, and that payment activity among non-problem banks is una®ected
by an outage.
3 LVTS Network Structure
As Figure 1 illustrates, a network is a structure of nodes connected by links. In
the context of a payments system such as the LVTS, these nodes normally rep-
resent individual ¯nancial institutions, and links can represent payment °ows,
bilateral credit limits or other variables describing a relationship between two
¯nancial institutions over a given observation period. A link can be weighted
and directed, for example, according to the volume or value of payments that
occur between the sender and recipient that it connects.
Average gross daily payment activity for subgroups in the LVTS over the
course of 2008 are depicted in Figure 1. It emphasizes the network dominance
of the three largest banks, who made an average of over $58.7 billion in gross
payments among themselves per day. The next largest links were between the
three largest banks and the remaining big six banks, which account for $50.6
billion. Payments between the largest three banks and foreign subsidiaries
accounted for another $29.7 billion, while other payment activity is compara-
tively low in value. The average daily LVTS payment value in 2008, including
payments involving the Bank of Canada, was $181.6 billion.
In the network without aggregation into subgroups, most bilateral relation-
ships involve less than $1 billion in payment activity per day; most relationships
above that amount involve at least one of the three largest banks. Some bilat-
eral gross °ows between smaller participants and the three largest banks have
a magnitude comparable to those among the other big six.
Typical network measures simplify the payment °ows to unweighted links.
High-frequency intraday data make this simpli¯cation more palatable, since
the variability of transaction activity by participant is still captured. Payment
activity is extremely variable (i.e., there are few high-value payments and many
low-value payments); the transformation of these data into network measures
can make it more amenable to modelling.
Connectivity describes the proportion of actual links to potential links,
6An empirical issue is that it is di±cult to disentangle the strategic decision of delaying
payments from the possibility that many instructions could simply be received later in the
day (Mills and Nesmith 2006).
4while reciprocity is the proportion of reciprocated links to actual links. This
paper focuses on connectivity and reciprocity, due to their simplicity and inter-
pretability. The in- and out-degrees of a node count its number of ingoing and
outgoing links, respectively. The distance between two nodes is the length of
the shortest path between those two nodes, measured by the number of nodes
that must be travelled to, to reach the other node. When there is no path
between two nodes, that distance is unde¯ned, so distance-based measures are
calculated for the giant strongly connected component. This is the largest sub-
network where all members have both ingoing and outgoing links to the rest of
the subnetwork as a whole.
Apart from being measures of payment activity, network measures could
have further interpretations. Lower connectivity could imply lower overall liq-
uidity in the ¯nancial system, in the sense that fewer counterparties are engaged
in actively transacting at a particular moment. We might also interpret con-
nectivity as a characterization of the type of interdependence that exists. For
instance, high connectivity could imply that ¯nancial or operational stress at
a problem participant would be more evenly distributed across participants,
instead of the case where one counterparty takes the full weight of exposure.
Reciprocity, on the other hand, suggests the extent that payments tend toward
bilateral exchanges. Such coordination could help participants manage their
intraday liquidity.
One way to measure centrality is with the betweenness algorithm. The
betweenness centrality of a node is the probability that the node is used as an
intermediary on a shortest path between any two other nodes. Centralization
is a summary statistic; it takes the centrality scores of individual nodes and
sums up their deviations from the maximum centrality score. Centralization is
normalized by the theoretical maximum deviation to give a value in the range
of 0 (low) to 1 (high).
Network statistics with a daily sampling frequency describe the LVTS as
densely connected. The high connectivity, reciprocity and short average path
lengths re°ect how the LVTS already encompasses a main core of the Canadian
¯nancial system. This contrasts with the United States, where many peripheral
players in ¯nancial markets are members of Fedwire.
Intraday statistics better illustrate the strati¯cation that exists even within
this small group of LVTS participants. Di®erent intraday sampling frequencies
typically depict a similar evolution of network structure, shown in Figure 2.
Connectivity increases quickly in the morning after 8 a.m., before slowing to
a gradual increase, peaking at closer to 5 p.m. Reciprocity peaks at around 6
a.m. to 7 a.m. With betweenness centralization, an hourly frequency shows
greater centralization at around 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Calendar and time-of-day e®ects are the most important variables for ex-
plaining network structure. Embree and Roberts (2009) did not ¯nd that in-
creased credit-risk concerns during the ¯nancial crisis had a statistically signif-
icant e®ect on connectivity.
Simple network measures are the most readily interpretable in the context
of this study. Centrality and distance-based measures depend on the size of
5the giant strongly connected component, whereas connectivity and reciprocity
have a meaning that is independent of other features of the network.
4 LVTS and Operational Events Data
LVTS transaction-by-transaction payments data, for the 942 business days from
April 2004 to December 2007, are available to the Bank of Canada through the
CPA. The LVTS data include the sender, receiver, settlement time and tranche,
for each payment.7 From April 2004 to December 2007, about 170 operational
events related to the LVTS occurred, most of which were minor events such
as late payments and incorrect manual computer entries. Participant outages
have been relatively infrequent. Records contain a brief 1-line description of
the event, the start time, the duration, the name of the a®ected participant
and the severity,8 among other details.
Of these events, 28 originated from the Bank of Canada, 6 originated from
either CDSX, the CPA or SWIFT, and 6 had an \other" origin, such as telecom-
munications. Participants apart from the Bank of Canada accounted for the
rest of the events. The cause of an event was attributed to the following sources:
64 for process and procedures, 36 for human error, 8 for external sources such as
hydro and telecommunications, and 65 for internal systems issues such as sys-
tems connectivity, hardware and software. These classi¯cations are inevitably
subjective, and any given event could have more than one contributing cause.
Results included an inability to send payments (21 cases), a delay in a
particular type of payment (auction, CLS, bank note, participant or settlement
payment, 56 cases), the withholding of payments (19), insu±cient collateral
(6), constraint by a credit limit (2), other (46), or no signi¯cant impact (20),
with the possibility of multiple e®ects. Events involving an overall decline in
payments from the problem participant are likeliest to a®ect general LVTS
behaviour, rather than the delay of a particular payment.
Other quali¯cations remain for the Bank of Canada's LVTS operational
events data, apart from those mentioned in the introduction. Records do not
always give a complete range of times for di®erent stages of the event timeline.9
Additionally, we are primarily interested in knowing when other participants
become aware that there is a problem, through a CPA noti¯cation, since this
designates the disclosed phase when they might change their behaviour in re-
7The payments data do not cover the time periods of two notable events: the terrorist at-
tacks of 11 September 2001, and the electricity blackouts in August 2003. Detailed payments
data are generally not available earlier than April 2004. This paper extends the data set only
to 2007 due to the manual demands of verifying the operational events data for consistency
with respect to the payments data and CPA noti¯cation emails.
8The severity of an operational event is di±cult to quantify, particularly when none of
these events resulted in appreciable ¯nancial losses. In any case, the large majority of events,
with no noticeable impact, are rated by the Bank as negligible.
9These stages include when the event occurred, when the origin participant became aware,
when the origin participant noti¯ed the CPA, when the CPA noti¯ed others, when the prob-
lem was resolved and when the CPA noti¯ed other participants of this resolution.
6sponse to the new information. Thus we are not always able to con¯rm exact
start times and durations of the disclosed phase for some events.
A visual depiction of a partial outage illustrates the elements involved. Fig-
ure 3 shows the timeline for the main stages of an operational event, super-
imposed in red lines on the connectivity of the LVTS, the connectivity of the
subnetwork that excludes the problem participant, the mean connectivity of
that subnetwork, and the region between the mean positive and negative devi-
ations from the mean connectivity shaded in grey.10 The red bars at the bottom
indicate the in-degree, the number of links directed toward the problem partic-
ipant, on the right y-axis. Figure 4 graphs the corresponding situation for the
total value transacted.
The ¯gures reveal that if network-wide reactions to an operational event are
present, they are subtle; visually, a reaction in LVTS or subnetwork connectivity
is impossible to distinguish from random °uctuations in LVTS activity. Bank
A's partial outage in 2004 leaves a noticeable e®ect on network structure relative
to other events; the connectivity of the LVTS and the subnetwork without Bank
A stays close to the lower end of the average negative deviation from the mean.
The total value transacted in the network jumps shortly after CPA noti¯cation
of the problem's resolution.
A change in LVTS behaviour directly with respect to the problem partici-
pant is more visible. Bank A in-degree and in-value are abnormally low during
the 2004 event, but spike brie°y after CPA noti¯cation of the problem's reso-
lution; most partial outages at other major banks show more temporary hes-
itations in problem participant in-degree, but the value of payments to these
problem participants does reach a low level. There is still variability in pay-
ment value, however, which a network approach obscures. This serves as a
reminder that network analysis can be a blunt tool, possibly better suited for
detecting systemic e®ects or major developments in how participants interact
over a longer time period.
4.1 Filtering of operational events
This paper focuses on events involving an interruption in payments from the
problem participant, such as partial outages, and other events that prompted
a noti¯cation from the CPA, such as when the problem participant experiences
a slowdown in its ability to make payments. Other events might involve an
interruption in certain payments; however, for an event to cause a deliberate
and general reaction among LVTS participants, there would plausibly have to
have been some form of alert from the CPA.11 The analysis further excludes
the following types of events:
² Events the duration of which occur mainly outside regular business hours
(before 8 a.m. and after 6 p.m.), when it would be impossible to gauge
10The distribution is not necessarily symmetrical around the mean.
11Impact categorizations give largely insigni¯cant results in the models, and usually do not
correspond to any aggregate reduction in payments made by the problem participant, except
for those that involve an outage or an inability to send.
7participant behaviour because activity is normally very low during these
periods.12 Although CLS pay-ins in the early morning are important,
they would more suitably be covered by a di®erent type of analysis.
² Events of short duration (typically less than 30 minutes), if we cannot be
reasonably certain that the CPA sent out a noti¯cation.
² A small number of other events where information in the LVTS partici-
pant report seems to be too inconsistent with actual payment activity.13
4.2 CPA email noti¯cations
Bank of Canada economists have previously identi¯ed the stages that take place
for any given event; initially, there is the undisclosed phase when an event has
occurred and the rest of the LVTS is not yet aware of the problem.14 When the
CPA noti¯es the LVTS participants of the event, the disclosed phase begins.
The Canadian Payments Association sends out a brief email that identi¯es the
problem participant, and whether that participant is experiencing an inability
to send/receive payments, or experiencing a slowdown in payments. Occasion-
ally, the email gives an estimate of the time to recovery.15 After disclosure,
other participants still might not suspend payments to the problem partici-
pant, if they do not expect the problem to be serious or protracted enough to
warrant precautionary behaviour.
An absence of a CPA email record does not guarantee that an email was not
sent. If an email could have been sent, because of the nature of the problem
and its duration, or if the time stamp on the email is simply missing, then it
would be preferable not to discard this event. Informed judgment, based on
payment activity and typical time delays for stages of the event timeline, helps
to determine a reasonable time for these noti¯cations. In practice, though,
12Too many interacted variables would be required to appropriately handle such events in
a model, given the total number of usable events. LVTS network connectivity is relatively
high during daytime business hours, but it is signi¯cantly more sparse outside of that period.
Regardless, there would not be any informative behavioural changes, if payment activity is
already minimal.
13Examples include the following: (1) the event description states that the problem par-
ticipant was \unable to send payments," even though there was no interruption or CPA
email; the LVTS participant report might describe a di®erent type of problem; (2) the event
description states that the problem participant was \unable to send payments," even when a
CPA email states that the problem participant was unable to receive payments, and payment
activity continued.
14It seems likely that other participants will not immediately infer that there is a problem,
although it could be possible; for example, if there had been a pre-agreed coordination of
payments, or if communication occurs without CPA intermediation.
15The participant is expected to notify the CPA within 15 minutes of detecting a partial
outage (Canadian Payments Association 2011), and subsequently the CPA aims to notify
other LVTS participants on a best-e®orts basis. As shown in Table 4, actual delays can
vary relative to these recommendations. Delays can occur because the participant might not
notice the problem immediately, or because it does not report it immediately.
8for most signi¯cant events that might have had a general e®ect on payment
activity, an email time stamp can be found.16
This leaves us with 54 partial outages that Table 1 summarizes by partic-
ipant subgroup and event type. Forty-one of these events involve an actual
interruption in payments from the problem participant, while the remaining
13 either involve a slowdown in payment transmission or otherwise result in
a CPA email stating that the participant was unable to send. For simplicity,
this paper will often refer to all of these events as \partial outages." The three
largest banks represent seven of these events. Table 1 should help to emphasize
the limited number of events, especially if further restrictions are imposed; 19
events last less than an hour, and only three events simultaneously involve one
of the largest three banks, an actual interruption in payments and a duration of
greater than an hour. Table 2 similarly shows that the Bank of Canada rated
only ¯ve events as having medium severity, while all others were either of low
or negligible severity. Figure 5 and Table 3 show the distribution of start times
and event calendar quarters. There were 17 of these events in 2005, 9 in 2006,
and 17 in the ¯rst half of 2007 but only 1 in the second half of that year.
Table 4 summarizes the duration of the di®erent stages in the event timeline,
based on available records. Participants, on average, take 22 minutes to notify
the CPA after detection of a problem, compared to a CPA guideline of 15
minutes. The CPA has no set time requirement for notifying LVTS participants
after an alert from a problem participant, and operates on a best-e®orts basis.
The CPA took an average of 15 minutes after the receipt of an alert to notify
LVTS participants both for a disruption and resolution. There is variation in
how long noti¯cation takes, or how long the disclosed and undisclosed phases
of an event can last. The average event duration is close to two hours. The
average durations of the undisclosed and disclosed periods were 70 minutes and
68 minutes, respectively, based on available reported times.
5 Methodology
Disturbances in network measures such as connectivity and reciprocity, as well
as the total value and volume of transactions before, during and after events,
could potentially indicate altered participant behaviour with regards to an op-
erational event. The distribution of these network statistics for the relevant
time of day and calendar period provides a basis of comparison.
The analysis starts with a Fisher sign test, which compares the number
of times that connectivity is either above or below its mean during speci¯c
partial outages. A 1-month moving average of connectivity for the relevant
5-minute time interval is used as the mean. This descriptive test provides a
non-parametric way to evaluate individual events for precautionary behaviour
toward a problem participant. It gives an initial sense of whether network
16Bowman (1983) emphasizes the importance of ascertaining the timing of an event accu-
rately; an examination of LVTS payment activity suggests that a misalignment of start and
end times would a®ect the analysis considerably.
9characteristics changed, for speci¯c cases.
The econometric models then seek to explain how network structure, and
thus participant behaviour, relates in a general way to partial outages. Con-
nectivity and reciprocity are the dependent variables, while a dummy variable
represents the ongoing disclosed phase of an operational event.17 The models
control for holiday e®ects, time dependence (by demeaning network variables),
the type of origin participant, type of problem (either a payment interruption
or a payment slowdown) and Bank of Canada-rated event severity. Payment
activity in the LVTS is strongly characterized by a daily pattern of activity, so,
to control for this time dependence, the network variables are demeaned by a
1-month moving average of each particular 5-minute interval. A 1-month mov-
ing average is used instead of di®erencing with a 24-hour lag, because of the
volatility in the series. For the connectivity model estimation, connectivity was
also corrected for the e®ect of a halt in payments from the problem participant,
such that the model estimates the response from other participants.
The analysis uses a 5-minute sampling frequency, meaning that a network
structure snapshot is taken of the payment activity that accumulates over each
5-minute period. Embree and Roberts (2009) determine that sampling fre-
quencies between ¯ve minutes and an hour portray a similar network structure
evolution over the course of a day. Due to the short duration of most opera-
tional events, a 5-minute frequency is likely the most suitable for this study.
This paper focuses on Tranche 2 payments, since that is the standard means
for LVTS participants to make payments e±ciently. Tranche 1 payments are
less numerous, and typically involve the Bank of Canada, so they would not
measurably a®ect the network analysis, but can be of signi¯cant amounts; they
are therefore considered on an event-by-event basis.
5.1 Fisher sign tests
Rather than jumping straight to an econometric model that perhaps naÄ ³vely
presumes to draw general conclusions about the impact of certain operational
event attributes, the Fisher sign test is a starting point for comparing network
connectivity during a particular operational event to normal LVTS conditions.
The Fisher sign test compares the number of times a variable is either
above or below its mean, and assumes that, under normal conditions, there is
an independent and equal probability for either the high or low state in each
period. Given this assumption, the probability of drawing a particular number
of observations above the mean corresponds to the binomial distribution. With
respect to network connectivity, the assumption of a binomial distribution is
reasonable in that close to half of the observations for a given time of day are
above the mean; the result from the outage period can be compared to the rest
of the day, as a benchmark. Although the Fisher test does make simpli¯cations,
it gives an interpretable case-focused alternative to a model, and allows us to
17Thus the actual period of time when the event was taking place is not represented in the
models, but rather the time of other participants' awareness of a problem.
10recognize that any given operational event could have an e®ect that does not
correspond to the general aspects of other disruptions.
The following equation calculates the P-value for the Fisher sign test by
summing the probabilities of obtaining n+ or fewer observations greater than
the mean, for a binomial distribution with N observations:








where n+ is the actual number of observations greater than the mean, for the
event (Weisstein 1999). The mean is taken to be the 1-month moving average
of connectivity for that speci¯c 5-minute interval of the day, since this would
be a more relevant comparison than a mean for the entire sample.
5.2 Model speci¯cation
The models search for an overall e®ect on the network structure, including
the direct consequence that other participants might suspend payments to the
problem participant, which would materialize as a drop in connectivity.
Importantly, we would expect that participant reactions would depend on
whether the problem participant has already absorbed a substantial level of
liquidity. Although the other participants would not be aware of this balance,
the rest of the LVTS will have an aggregate balance complementary to that of
the problem participant. The model thus includes an interacted variable repre-
senting the net accumulated Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 balance for the current
problem participant, during the disclosed phase of any operational events. For
any other non-event time, this variable is set to zero, since there is no problem
participant. The model can be summarized as follows:
ct = ® + CIVt¯civ + USt¯US + IP BIG6t¯B6 + IP OTHERt¯OTHER
+SPt¯SP + ETR lte30t¯ETR + BAL OEt¯BAL + "t;
where ct is the connectivity of the network, demeaned by the 1-month moving
average of the relevant time interval to remove most of the time dependence
in the series; CIV and US are dummy vectors for civic and U.S. holidays,
respectively; IP BIG6 is a dummy for an interruption of payments from a big
six bank; IP OTHER is likewise for an interruption of payments from a non-
big six bank; ETR lte30 is a dummy for an estimated time to recovery of less
than or equal to 30 minutes in the CPA email; SP represents a slowdown of
payments; BAL OE is the net payment balance of the problem participant (if
there is an outage for that time interval); and "t is an error term.
The inclusion of two or three lags of the dependent variable, and autoregres-
sive and moving-average terms of one lag, results in residuals that have minimal
autocorrelation and that are not rejected by Bartlett's periodogram-based test
for white noise. Estimation proceeds with this approach, even if it could result
in conservative estimates; persistence in the data could occur for a number of
11reasons that would vary across time. A low-activity day will likely have many
adjoining 5-minute intervals with fewer payments than average, but the lagged
terms will also capture part of the e®ect that could otherwise be legitimately
attributed to a partial outage. Furthermore, the estimation of coe±cients for
the lagged terms will be driven by periods of normal activity, because partial
outages a®ect only a small part of the data.
We might also expect a change when a problem continues to be unresolved
after a certain period of time, or soon after normal activity is restored. Includ-
ing the appropriate variables does not o®er much improvement, though. Bank
economists have previously observed a brief spike in the volume of payments
to the problem participant after resumption of normal activity, but this partic-
ular e®ect does not noticeably translate to a similar overcompensation in the
network structure after an event. Neither does an attempt to include intervals
of elapsed time during the disclosed phase improve the model.




t = ® + CIVt¯civ + USt¯US + IPit¯IPi + SPit¯SPi + "t;
where c
¡i
t is the connectivity of the subnetwork that excludes the problem
participant i. IPi and SPi are speci¯c to problem participant i in this case,
while "t is an error term.
6 Results
Table 8 summarizes the results of the Fisher test for nine partial outages, along
with the evolution in the net balance position of the problem participant for
both Tranches 1 and 2, at the start of the problem, the start of the disclosed
phase and the end of the problem.18
The test result for connectivity is insigni¯cant for the small-participant
events, while it is signi¯cant for most large-participant events when looking at
the entire LVTS network, at a 5 per cent level or higher. In contrast, during the
rest of the event day, close to half of the observations are above the mean (45
per cent for large banks and 42 per cent for the others). Problem participant
in-degree (not shown), as a measure of the direct response toward the problem
participant, is always lower than the mean, for the largest six banks, and usually
also for other banks.
The e®ect on the subnetwork of non-problem participants is only somewhat
signi¯cant for a couple of events at larger banks at, or close to, a 10 per cent
level. One such case occurred despite the bank's previously mentioned negative
net position of over $1 billion throughout its 2007 partial outage. For other
events, the problem participant often does accumulate liquidity; in one case
(not shown), the bank absorbed around $1.43 billion in payments before the
CPA was able to disclose the problem to other participants. The bank had
18It is possible that the problem participant's net balance would decline if they were to use
alternative measures (e.g., manual processing) to make payments.
12reached a balance of $1.52 billion by the time it resolved its problem soon after.
Compared to the value of LVTS payments transacted by a big participant, this
level of liquidity absorption would not be of systemic concern.
These ¯ndings lend support to the model results that a disruption at a
participant leads to a precautionary reduction from others, while the e®ect is
noticeable on a network-wide scale only for the largest banks. Events that
involved a notable positive accumulation of liquidity seem to have mostly oc-
curred in 2004 or 2005.
6.1 Model analysis
Tables 5 and 6, respectively, show results of model estimation for two key
statistics: connectivity and reciprocity. We should interpret the individual
coe±cients with the caveat that these estimates correspond to a limited number
of operational events, most of which have a negligible e®ect on the system.
The connectivity model in Table 5 results in an expected negative sign
for the net-balance variable, signi¯cant at a 1 per cent level. The coe±cient
implies that for a $1 billion net position at a problem participant, the network's
connectivity tends to decline by 0.0054; combined with the coe±cient of -0.0075
for a payment interruption from a big six bank (also signi¯cant at a 1 per cent
level), and an average connectivity of 0.188 during the regular business day
(8 a.m. to 6 p.m.), this would represent a decline in network connectivity (in
levels) of about 6 or 7 per cent, above and beyond the reduction in payment
activity owing to the problem participant not sending payments. This is about
half of a standard deviation, for a 1-hour average of connectivity (the disclosed
phase is, on average, 68 minutes), across most given periods of a day (e.g., the
standard deviation of connectivity at 12 p.m., across all days).
This e®ect should be taken in the context that the problem participant is
only 1 of 14 participants (not counting the Bank of Canada), and that the de-
pendent variables were corrected for the e®ect of a halt in payments from the
problem participant, such that the model estimates the response from other
participants. Considering these factors, the 6 or 7 per cent reduction could be
seen as a moderate but meaningful tendency of participants to exercise pre-
caution toward a problem participant. It suggests that banks actively manage
their payment activity throughout the day, and do not send payments with
complete obliviousness. Presumably, one motivation for this could be to main-
tain a reasonable liquidity position. For connectivity, which is a network-wide
measure, this precaution is mainly noticeable with respect to big six banks; the
dummy coe±cient for other banks was not signi¯cant.
Arguably, the lagged terms will capture a part of an operational event's
e®ect; persistence in the data could occur for many reasons, which will likely
vary over time. It seems likely that an operational event would be a relatively
important explanation for some of this persistence, while the event is occur-
ring, so it could be reasonable to also estimate the model without lagged terms.
Excluding these terms, in a comparable ordinary least squares model, the es-
timated e®ect of a partial outage (signi¯cant at a 1 per cent level) would be
13more than twice as large, at 13 per cent. This is mainly due to an increase
in coe±cient for a payment interruption from a big six bank, to -0.02.19 The
general pattern could easily be overridden in particular cases. For example, a
major bank was in a negative net position of between $2.5 and $1 billion dur-
ing a 2007 partial outage, but participants appear to have exercised precaution,
based on payment activity and the corresponding e®ect on connectivity.
Most participants have not experienced slowdown events, according to our
data, and the slow-payments coe±cient is not signi¯cant. An estimated time
to recovery of less than 30 minutes has a small positive e®ect (signi¯cant at the
10 per cent level), whereas if the problem participant is not one of the largest
six banks, the network-wide e®ect is not perceptible. An F-test shows that the
event variables are signi¯cant as a group.
Table 6 shows a decline in reciprocity for a problem at a big six bank of
about ¡0:056, signi¯cant at the 1 per cent level, which would represent about
12 per cent of the network's reciprocity, during the regular business day, and
about 1.1 standard deviations. This is not surprising, if others occasionally
continue to send to a problem participant that has ceased making payments.
Thus, while the connectivity result suggests precautionary behaviour, the reci-
procity model shows that this precaution does not entail a complete halting
of payments.20 A drop in reciprocity among non-problem participants could
imply further reduced coordination in the payments system. This would not be
desirable, if net exposures persist longer. But it does not seem that reciprocity
falls among non-problem participants, based on the modelling of reciprocity in
the subnetwork that excludes the problem participant.
Table 7 summarizes the results of the subnetwork models that look for an im-
pact on connectivity, in levels, between non-problem participants. Since these
models are speci¯c to a particular participant's operational events, they are
even further limited by the small number of disruptions. Based on this limited
evidence, the e®ect on the subnetwork that excludes the problem participant
is not statistically signi¯cant, especially when the model includes lagged terms
(lagged dependent variables, and autoregressive and moving-average terms of
one lag). There is also no apparent indirect e®ect from operational events on
reciprocity among the subnetwork of non-problem participants. Without the
lagged terms, though, the coe±cients for two large banks suggest a decline in
connectivity in the non-problem subnetwork of about 4 and 10 per cent, re-
spectively, indicating that indirect network-wide e®ects on payment activity
are also possible, even for a partial outage of one or two hours. Such an e®ect
would, in theory, re°ect a deterioration in payments coordination because of
participants' reluctance to risk a decline in their liquidity positions.
19Only an R2 of 0.033 can be attributed to the model's variables, without lagged terms,
but this should be expected given that there were 54 events of limited duration in a data set
spanning 942 days.
20The proportional e®ect between connectivity and reciprocity is not directly comparable.
Larger banks likely account for a greater share of total reciprocity, due to their centrality
in the network. Also, connectivity was adjusted to compensate for the e®ect of a halt in
payments from the problem participant. For reciprocity, this adjustment would make less
sense, because its purpose is to illustrate bilateral coordination.
14Table 7 also shows the e®ect on the in-degree to the problem participant.
About 46 per cent fewer participants tend to send payments to the problem
participant in an average period, compared to the relevant average in-degree,
when it is one of the largest six banks. The e®ect on other banks is similarly
large, in percentage terms, with a 48 per cent reduction, on average, although
the in-degree for these other banks is usually less than a third that of the largest
six banks. These results con¯rm that bilateral precautionary behaviour occurs
with respect to a problem participant, even when the problem participant is not
one of the largest banks. The implication is that participants tend to perceive a
partial outage at a counterparty as potentially inconvenient enough to warrant
a delaying of payments, at least to the problem counterparty. In the case of the
big six problem participants, though, the network-wide e®ect is perceptible, as
shown in Table 5.
Models relating Tranche 1 in- or out-payments to the problem participant
do not reveal a marked tendency to use Tranche 1 during an operational event.
However, in speci¯c cases this can occur. With a couple of major bank partial
outages, problem participant use of Tranche 1 made a signi¯cant di®erence for
the participant's outstanding balance.
6.2 Discussion
Partial outages at the largest ¯ve or six banks consistently had the most impact
on participant behaviour, and thus network structure. A precautionary reac-
tion toward the problem participant would be desirable, to the extent that it
prevents an absorption of liquidity by this participant, which is not able to send
payments itself. A large positive balance position for the problem participant
at time of disclosure does also seem to be a meaningful factor for reducing con-
nectivity. Yet Table 8 gives an example of where a major bank's large negative
balance position is not enough to dissuade other participants' precautionary
reactions, during the decline in connectivity of the 2007 event.
The results of this study do not suggest that options for the handling of
operational events are inadequate, or that the Bank of Canada needs to in-
crease operational assistance to LVTS participants. Previous improvements in
contingency measures possibly helped in this regard. Given the apparent pre-
cautionary behaviour with respect to big-bank outages, unless the bank had
already reached a critical accumulation of funds by the start of the disclosed
phase, it would appear unlikely that the situation would reach that point after
a CPA noti¯cation. When an event does occur, contingency measures can re-
duce the likely impact of the disruption and the corresponding reactions from
other participants. Manual entry of payments is one such option when system
problems prevent automatic processing.
Examples include the manual processing of payments during three of a
smaller bank's events in 2006 and 2007. In addition, at least one major bank
took advantage of the LVTS Direct Network to send a CDSX settlement pay-
ment of close to $2 billion during a 2007 outage. If participants prioritize the
small fraction of payments that are of high value, these interim measures should
15be e®ective.
If there was concern for the possibility of a liquidity trap, the system could
notify participants more quickly of a disruption through automatic and high-
frequency tests of system functionality. This test could verify that all partic-
ipants are able to send and receive payments. A standardized electronic form
that the problem participant uses to promptly notify the CPA about an op-
erational event, which then triggers an automatic noti¯cation for other LVTS
participants, might also reduce the length of the undisclosed phase. It could be
reasonable, though, for a participant to delay its noti¯cation to the CPA, if this
enables it to assess a problem and verify that it interferes with the functionality
of the LVTS. If that is the case, the relevant CPA guideline could be revised.
Continuing on the theme of analyzing the network's response to external
shocks, future research could investigate the network's response to Bank of
Canada policy actions or changes, including repo transactions, term lending or
the expanded eligibility of collateral. These measures were intended to reduce
the cost of intraday liquidity, which, following Bech and Garratt (2006), could
a®ect morning versus afternoon payments coordination equilibrium. Disrup-
tions originating at a payment, clearing and settlement system or the Bank of
Canada represent another category of operational events.
6.3 Limitations
The LVTS functions very well, and there are few serious and persistent disrup-
tions to the system; the lack of suitable data is a common problem for the study
of operational risk. This could limit the robustness of the results, especially
given idiosyncratic events that are heterogeneous in the problem participant,
the time of day and the nature of the problem. Because there might be only a
couple of events, if any, for a given participant, one should proceed with caution
before generalizing the results.
Participants might not perceive the need to alter their payment behaviour
during an operational event a®ecting another participant, since many problems
can be resolved in a short amount of time. This would appear to be the case for
many of the events in our data set, especially with respect to small problem-
participants.
It is also unclear how the experience of routine events informs us of the reper-
cussions of more serious outages. We should remain cautious in extrapolating
from past experience to make conjectures about low-probability, high-impact
events in Canada's payments systems.
A complete understanding of the behaviour in the LVTS requires more than
network measures. A small number of payments made through alternate means
could be su±cient to signi¯cantly change the net accumulated balance of the
problem participant, which would not be re°ected in a network analysis. Nev-
ertheless, a network approach could give a better appreciation of the possible
systemic implications of disruptions, which admittedly did not arise in the
events examined in this study.
167 Conclusions
The ¯ndings suggest that other participants tend to withhold payments to
the problem participant, but using a network approach, the e®ect is mainly
perceptible for the big six banks. The main econometric model illustrates that
participants tend to withhold more payments when the problem participant
has already absorbed a great deal of liquidity: for a $1 billion net position
at a big six bank experiencing a partial outage, connectivity is estimated to
decline by about 6 or 7 per cent. Given that there are 14 participants in the
LVTS, this can be viewed as a moderate and meaningful e®ect on LVTS activity.
Arguably, it suggests that banks actively manage their liquidity throughout the
day, and do not send payments with complete obliviousness. The implication
is that participants perceive a partial outage at a counterparty as potentially
inconvenient enough to warrant a delaying of payments, at least to the problem
counterparty.
The e®ects of a partial outage, on only a couple of occasions, might have
in°uenced how non-problem participants interact amongst themselves, based on
the subnetwork model and Fisher sign tests, but it is di±cult to say that there
has been much change in behaviour among non-problem participants. Overall, a
partial outage in the LVTS would not seem likely to cause a systemic disruption.
The incidence of operational events did not increase over the sample period, and
cases that involved an accumulation of liquidity seem to have mostly occurred
in 2004 or 2005. The improvement of contingency measures, such as the use of
the LVTS Direct Network, might have helped in this regard.
Network analysis is a blunt tool for dealing with participant-speci¯c reac-
tions, but can help to assess the broader impact of a disruption on the structure
of participant interactions. Another limitation for studies on operational risk
is the lack of data, and the di±culty in predicting the implications of a low-
probability, high-impact event based on past experience.
If the occurrence of a sudden liquidity trap is a genuine concern, then real-
time automatic monitoring of system functionality could be a solution. How-
ever, it is not clear that this would be warranted, given that a small number of
manually processed payments can alleviate a liquidity trap.
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18Table 1: Event Type by Participant
Payment Impact
Origin No interruption Interruption
Duration
<hour >hour <hour >hour Total
Big six 2 2 10 7 21
Others 2 7 5 19 33
Individual Banks
Median 0 0 0.5 1 2.5
Min. 0 0 0 0 0
Max. 2 4 5 6 10
Total 4 9 15 26 54




<hour >hour <hour >hour <hour >hour Total
Big six 8 2 4 4 3 21
Others 5 11 2 13 2 33
Individual Banks
Median 0 0 0 1 0 0 2.5
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max. 5 4 2 4 0 1 10
Total 13 13 6 17 0 5 54
19Table 3: Distribution of Events by Year and Quarter
Quarter
Year 1 2 3 4 Total
2004 0 4 4 2 10
2005 4 4 3 6 17
2006 2 2 1 4 9
2007 6 11 1 0 18
Total 12 21 9 12 54
Table 4: Summary of Event Timeline Phases (minutes)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Time for participant to notice problem 31 76 -5 376
Time for participant to notify CPA 22 50 0 268
Time for CPA to notify others 15 15 0 66
Time for CPA to con¯rm resolution 10 17 -81 44
Undisclosed period 70 139 -10 673
Disclosed period 68 57 7 298
Actual duration of event 128 163 12 750
Table 5: Estimation Results: Connectivity, Demeaned by 1-Month Moving
Average
Variable Coe±cient (Std. err.) P > jtj
Equation 1: Connectivity
Civic holiday -0.0404 (0.0023) 0.0000
U.S. holiday -0.0104 (0.0015) 0.0000
Payment interruption, big six -0.0075 (0.0021) 0.0010
Payment interruption, other 0.0016 (0.0017) 0.3380
Payment slowdown 0.0005 (0.0031) 0.8650
ETR less than 30 minutes 0.0084 (0.0038) 0.0260
Prblm-Bank Balance ($bn) -0.0054 (0.0000) 0.0080
Depvar, 1st lag 0.1562 (0.0017) 0.0000
Depvar, 2nd lag 0.0173 (0.0016) 0.0000
Intercept 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.7780
Equation 2: ARMA
L.ar 0.9770 (0.0006) 0.0000
L.ma -0.9174 (0.0013) 0.0000
Equation 3: sigma





20Table 6: Estimation Results: Reciprocity, Demeaned by 1-Month Moving Av-
erage
Variable Coe±cient (Std. err.) P > jtj
Equation 1: Reciprocity
Civic holiday -0.3057 (0.0077) 0.0000
U.S. holiday -0.0647 (0.0034) 0.0000
Payment interruption, big six -0.0557 (0.0146) 0.0000
Payment interruption, other 0.0165 (0.0117) 0.1560
Payment slowdown 0.0012 (0.0230) 0.9570
ETR less than 30 minutes 0.0119 (0.0334) 0.7210
Prblm-Bank Balance -0.0053 (0.0130) 0.6850
Depvar, 1st lag 0.0839 (0.0019) 0.0000
Depvar, 2nd lag 0.0181 (0.0019) 0.0000
Depvar, 3rd lag 0.0152 (0.0019) 0.0000
Intercept 0.0089 (0.0006) 0.0000
Equation 2: ARMA
L.ar 0.9792 (0.0026) 0.0000
L.ma -0.9644 (0.0034) 0.0000
Equation 3: sigma





Table 7: Partial Outage E®ects on Subnetworks Excluding Problem Participant
(For big six)
Connectivity In-degree
Mean Coe±cient Coe±cient % E®ect
LVTS 0.1946
(Bank 1) 0.1720 -0.002 -2.07¤¤ -47
(Bank 2) 0.1709 0.004 -1.54¤¤ -36
(Bank 3) 0.1961 0.004 -1.22¤¤ -48
(Bank 4) 0.1425 -0.008 -2.19¤¤ -36
(Bank 5) 0.1678 -0.002 -2.87¤¤ -65
(Bank 6) 0.1760 n/a n/a




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mean +/− deviation (3 months) Connectivity (mean) without Bank A
Connectivity Connectivity without Bank A
In−degree (Bank A)
Connectivity, 5−minute Intervals
Event 1: Bank A, 2004
Vertical black lines depict when the participant becomes aware of the problem, when the
CPA noti¯es others, and when the CPA noti¯es others of the event end. Other important
stages of the event, such as when the problem occurs and when the participant noti¯es the
CPA, are not depicted for space reasons, and to emphasize the disclosure period to other
participants. Lines show the connectivity of the LVTS, the connectivity of the subnetwork
that excludes the problem participant, and the mean connectivity of that subnetwork; the
region between the mean positive and negative deviations from the mean connectivity is
shaded in grey. The red bars indicate the in-degree, the number of links directed toward the
problem participant, on the right y-axis.


























































































































Mean +/− deviation (3 months) In−value (Bank A)
Total value (mean) without Bank A Total value
Total value without Bank A
Total Value, 5−minute Intervals
Event 1: Bank A, 2004
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Distribution of Partial Outage Events, by Hour of Start Time
25Appendix A: De¯nitions of Measures
This appendix de¯nes the measures used in the main text. For more informa-
tion, refer to SoramÄ aki et al. (2006), or Embree and Roberts (2009). Wasser-
man and Faust (1994), and Jackson (2006), also o®er overviews of social network
analysis.
A.1 Connection-Based Measures
Connectivity is c = m
N(N¡1) and reciprocity is r = mr
m where
² N is the number of nodes
² m is the number of directed links
² mr is the number of reciprocated links
A.2 Distance-Based Measures
The distance dij is the length of the shortest path between i and j and can be
computed from the power matrices Mp of the adjacency matrix M that repre-
sents the presence of links between nodes, with p 2 =;1 · p · N ¡ 1. dij is
the value of p where the matrix element (Mp)ij ¯rst becomes non-zero.
The average path length of a node is li = 1
n¡1
P
j6=i dij. The average path length




A.3 Centrality and Centralization
Degree centrality is CD(nv) =
d(nv)
N¡1, where
² d(nv) is the degree (either in-, out-, or the average of both) of node nv.








² gij is the number of shortest paths from i to j
² givj is the number of shortest paths from i to j through v





² CZ(ni) is the chosen centrality measure, for node i
² TMAXDEVCZ is the theoretical maximum deviation of the numerator,
based on the number of nodes in the network, used to normalize the
centralization measure
26